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Abstract
In this work, we describe a new deep learning based
method that can effectively distinguish AI-generated fake
videos (referred to as DeepFake videos hereafter) from real
videos. Our method is based on the observations that cur-
rent DeepFake algorithm can only generate images of lim-
ited resolutions, which need to be further warped to match
the original faces in the source video. Such transforms leave
distinctive artifacts in the resulting DeepFake videos, and
we show that they can be effectively captured by convo-
lutional neural networks (CNNs). Compared to previous
methods which use a large amount of real and DeepFake
generated images to train CNN classifier, our method does
not need DeepFake generated images as negative training
examples since we target the artifacts in affine face warp-
ing as the distinctive feature to distinguish real and fake
images. The advantages of our method are two-fold: (1)
Such artifacts can be simulated directly using simple image
processing operations on a image to make it as negative ex-
ample. Since training a DeepFake model to generate nega-
tive examples is time-consuming and resource-demanding,
our method saves a plenty of time and resources in training
data collection; (2) Since such artifacts are general existed
in DeepFake videos from different sources, our method is
more robust compared to others. Our method is evaluated
on two sets of DeepFake video datasets for its effectiveness
in practice.
1. Introduction
The increasing sophistication of mobile camera technol-
ogy and the ever-growing reach of social media and media
sharing portals have made the creation and propagation of
digital videos more convenient than ever before. Until re-
cently, the number of fake videos and their degrees of re-
alism have been limited by the lack of sophisticated edit-
ing tools, the high demand on domain expertise, and the
complex and time-consuming process involved. However,
the time of fabrication and manipulation of videos has de-
creased significantly in recent years, thanks to the acces-
sibility to large-volume training data and high-throughput
computing power, but more to the growth of machine learn-
ing and computer vision techniques that eliminate the need
for manual editing steps.
In particular, a new vein of AI-based fake video gen-
eration methods known as DeepFake has attracted a lot
of attention recently. It takes as input a video of a spe-
cific individual (’target’), and outputs another video with
the target’s faces replaced with those of another individ-
ual (’source’). The backbone of DeepFake are deep neu-
ral networks trained on face images to automatically map
the facial expressions of the source to the target. With
proper post-processing, the resulting videos can achieve a
high level of realism.
In this paper, we describe a new deep learning based
method that can effectively distinguish DeepFake videos
from the real ones. Our method is based on a property of
the DeepFake videos: due to limitation of computation re-
sources and production time, the DeepFake algorithm can
only synthesize face images of a fixed size, and they must
undergo an affine warping to match the configuration of the
source’s face. This warping leaves distinct artifacts due to
the resolution inconsistency between warped face area and
surrounding context. As such, this artifacts can be used to
detect DeepFake Videos.
Our method detects such artifacts by comparing the gen-
erated face areas and their surrounding regions with a ded-
icated Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model. To
train the CNN model, we simplify the process by simu-
lating the resolution inconsistency in affine face warpings
directly. Specifically, we first detect faces and then extract
landmarks to compute the transform matrices to align the
faces to a standard configuration. We apply Gaussian blur-
ring to the aligned face, which is then affine warped back to
original image using the inverse of the estimated transfor-
mation matrix. In order to simulate more different resolu-
tion cases of affine warped face, we align faces into multiple
scales to increase the data diversity (see Figure 2). Com-
pared to training a DeepFake model to generate fake im-
ages as negative data in [1, 10], which is time-consuming
and resource-demanding (∼ 72 hours on a NVIDIA GTX
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GPU), our method creates negative data only using simple
image processing operations which therefore saves a plenty
of time and computing resources. Moreover, other meth-
ods may be over-fit to a specific distribution of DeepFake
videos, our method is more robust since such artifacts are
general in different sources of DeepFake videos. Based
on our collected real face images from Internet and corre-
sponding created negative data, we train four CNN mod-
els: VGG16 [31], ResNet50, ResNet101 and ResNet152
[11]. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on
a DeepFake dataset from [20] and test several fake videos
on YouTube.
2. Related works
AI-based Video Synthesis Algorithms The new genera-
tion of AI-based video synthesis algorithms are based on
the recent developments in new deep learning models, es-
pecially the generative adversarial networks (GANs) [9]. A
GAN model consists of two deep neural networks trained in
tandem. The generator network aims to produce images that
cannot be distinguished from the training real images, while
the discriminator network aims to tell them apart. When
training completes, the generator is used to synthesize im-
ages with realistic appearance.
The GAN model inspired many subsequent works for
image synthesis, such as [8, 28, 2, 13, 32, 30, 21, 36, 3, 5].
Liu et al. [21] proposed an unsupervised image to image
translation framework based on coupled GANs, which aims
to learn the joint representation of images in different do-
mains. This algorithm is the basis for the DeepFake algo-
rithm.
The creation of a DeepFake video starts with an input
video of a specific individual (’target’), and generates an-
other video with the target’s faces replaced with that of an-
other individual (’source’), based on a GAN model trained
to translate between the faces of the target and the source,
see Figure 1. More recently, Zhu et al. [36] proposed cycle-
consistent loss to push the performance of GAN, namely
Cycle-GAN. Bansal et al. [3] stepped further and pro-
posed Recycle-GAN, which incorporated temporal infor-
mation and spatial cues with conditional generative adver-
sarial networks. StarGAN [5] learned the mapping across
multiple domains only using a single generator and discrim-
inator.
Resampling Detection. The artifacts introduced by the
DeepFake production pipeline is in essence due to affine
transforms to the synthesized face. In the literature of dig-
ital media forensics, detecting transforms or the underly-
ing resampling algorithm has been extensively studied, e.g.,
[25, 26, 22, 15, 16, 17, 7, 24, 27, 12, 4]. However, the
performance of these methods are affected by the post-
processing steps, such as image/video compression, which
are not subject to simple modeling. Besides, these methods
usually aim to estimate the exact resampling operation from
whole images, but for our purpose, a simpler solution can
be obtained by just comparing regions of potentially synthe-
sized faces and the rest of the image – the latter are expected
to be free of such artifacts while the existence of such arti-
facts in the former is a telltale cue for the video being a
DeepFake.
GAN Generated Image/Video Detection. Traditional
forgery can be detected using methods such as [35, 6]. Zhou
et al. [35] proposed two-stream CNN for face tampering de-
tection. NoisePrint [6] employed CNN model to trace de-
vice fingerprints for forgery detection. Recently, detecting
GAN generated images or videos has also made progress.
Li et al. [20] observed that DeepFake faces lack realistic
eye blinking, as training images obtained over the Inter-
net usually do not include photographs with the subject’s
eyes closed. The lack of eye blinking is detected with a
CNN/RNN model to expose DeepFake videos. However,
this detection can be circumvented by purposely incorpo-
rating images with closed eyes in training. Yang et al. [34]
utilized the inconsistency in head pose to detect fake videos.
The work [19] exploited the color disparity between GAN
generated images and real images in non-RGB color spaces
to classify them. The work [23] also analyzed the color dif-
ference between GAN images and real images. However,
it is not clear if this method is extensible to inspecting lo-
cal regions as in the case of DeepFake. Afchar et al. [1]
trained a convolutional neural networks namely MesoNet
to directly classify real faces and fake faces generated by
DeepFake and Face2face [33]. The work [10] extended [1]
to temporal domain by incorporating RNN on CNN. While
it shows promising performance, this holistic approach has
its drawback. In particular, it requires both real and fake
images as training data, and generating the fake images us-
ing the AI-based synthesis algorithms is less efficient than
the simple mechanism for training data generation in our
method.
3. Methods
We detect synthesized videos by exploiting the face
warping artifacts resulted from the DeepFake production
pipeline. For efficient running time, the current DeepFake
algorithms create synthesized face images of fixed sizes.
These faces are then undergone an affine transform (i.e.,
scaling, rotation and shearing) to match the poses of the
target faces that they will replace (see Figure 1 (g) – (h)).
As such, the facial region and surrounding regions in the
original image/video frame will present artifacts, the reso-
lution inconsistency due to such transforms after the subse-
quent compression step to generate the final image or video
frames. Therefore, we propose to use a Convolutional Neu-
ral Network (CNN) model to detect the presence of such
DeepFake
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Figure 1. Overview of the DeepFake production pipeline. (a) An image of the source. (b) Green box is the detected face area. (c) Red
points are face landmarks. (d) Transform matrix is computed to warp face area in (e) to the normalized region (f). (g) Synthesized face
image from the neural network. (h) Synthesized face warped back using the same transform matrix. (i) Post-processing including boundary
smoothing applied to the composite image. (g) The final synthesized image.
(a)
Face 
align
Gaussian
blur
(b) (d)
(c)
Figure 2. Overview of negative data generation. (a) is the original
image. (b) are aligned faces with different scales. We randomly
pick a scale of face in (b) and apply Gaussian blur as (c), which is
then affine warped back to (d).
artifacts from the detected face regions and its surrounding
areas.
The training of the CNN model is based on face im-
ages collected from the Internet. Specifically, we collect
24, 442 JPEG face images as positive examples. The nega-
tive examples can be generated by applying DeepFake algo-
rithms as in [1], but it requires us to train and run the Deep-
Fake algorithms, which is time-consuming and resource-
demanding. On the other hand, as the purpose here is to de-
tect the artifacts introduced by the affine face warping steps
in DeepFake production pipeline, we simplify the negative
example generation procedure by simulating the affine face
warping step (Figure 1) directly.
Specifically, as shown in Figure 2, we take the following
steps to generate negative examples to train the CNN model.
1. We detect faces in the original images and extract the
face region using software package dlib [14];
2. We align faces into multiple scales and randomly pick
one scale, which is then smoothed by a Gaussian blur
with kernel size (5 × 5). This process aims to cre-
ate more resolution cases in affine warped faces, which
can better simulate different kinds of resolution incon-
(a)
(b) (c) (d)
Figure 3. Illustration of face shape augmentation of negative ex-
amples. (a) is the aligned and blurred face, which then undergoes
an affine warped back to (b). (c, d) are post-processing for re-
fining the shape of face area. (c) denotes the whole warped face
is retained and (d) denotes only face area inside the polygon is
retained.
sistency introduced in affine face warping.
3. The smoothed face undergoes an affine warp back to
the same sizes of original faces to simulate the artifacts
in the DeeFake production pipeline.
To further enlarge the training diversity, we change
the color information: brightness, contrast, distortion and
sharpness for all training examples. In particular, we change
the shape of affine warped face area to simulate different
post-processing procedure in DeepFake pipeline. As shown
in Figure 3, the shape of affine warped face area can be
further processed based on face landmarks. Figure 3(d) de-
notes a convex polygon shape is created based on the face
landmarks of eye browns and the bottom of mouth.
From positive and negative examples, we crop regions
of interest (RoI) as the input of our networks. As our aim
is to expose the artifacts between fake face area and sur-
rounding area, the RoIs are chosen as the rectangle areas
that contains both the face and surrounding areas. Specif-
ically, we determine the RoIs using face landmarks, as
[y0− yˆ0, x0− xˆ0, y1+ yˆ1, x1+ xˆ1], where y0, x0, y1, x1 de-
notes the minimum bounding box bwhich can cover all face
Figure 4. Performance of each CNN model on all frames of
UADFV [34].
Figure 5. Performance of each CNN model on each video of
UADFV [34].
landmarks excluding the outline of the cheek. The variables
yˆ0, xˆ0, yˆ1, xˆ1 are random value between [0, h5 ] and [0,
w
8 ],
where h,w are height and width of b respectively. The RoIs
are resized to 224 × 224 to feed to the CNN models for
training.
We train four CNN models — VGG16 [31], ResNet50,
ResNet101 and ResNet152 [11] using our training data. For
inference, we crop the RoI of each training example by 10
times. Then we average predictions of all RoIs as the final
fake probability.
4. Experiments
We prepare our training data using the following strat-
egy: instead of generating all negative examples in advance
before training process, we employ a dynamic way to gen-
erate negative examples along with training process. For
each training batch, we randomly select half positive ex-
amples and convert them into negative examples following
the pipeline in Figure 2, which therefore makes the training
data more diversified. We set batch size as 64, learning rate
starting from 0.001 and decay 0.95 after each 1000 steps.
We use SGD optimization method and the training process
will be terminated until it reaches the maximum epoch. For
VGG16, we directly train it using our data and terminate it
at epoch 100. For ResNet50, ResNet101 and ResNet 152
models, we first load the ImageNet pretrained models and
fine tune them using our data. The training process will be
terminated at epoch 20. Then the models are fine-tuned us-
ing hard mining strategy. In our training, hard examples in-
clude positive examples with the predicted fake probability
greater than 0.5, and negative examples with the predicted
fake probability less than 0.5. We employ the same train-
ing procedure with learning rate from 0.0001. This stage is
terminated after 20 epochs.
4.1. Evaluations on UADFV
We validate our method on DeepFake video dataset
UADFV from [34]. This dataset contains 98 videos (32752
frames in total), which having 49 real videos and 49 fake
videos respectively. Each video has one subject and lasts
approximate 11 seconds. We evaluate the four models on
this dataset using Area Under Curve (AUC) metric on two
settings: image based evaluation and video based evalua-
tion.
For image based evaluation, we process and send frames
of all videos into our four networks respectively. Fig-
ure 4 illustrates the performance of each network on all
frames. As these results show, the VGG16, ResNet50,
ResNet101 and ResNet152 models achieve AUC perfor-
mance 83.3%, 97.4%, 95.4%, 93.8%, respectively. ResNet
networks have about 10% better performance compared
to VGG16, due to the residual connections, which make
the learning process more effective. Yet, ResNet50 has
the best performance among the other ResNet networks,
which shows that as the depth of network increases, the
classification-relevant information diminishes. For video
based evaluation, we take each video as the unit of anal-
ysis. Due to the illumination changes, head motions and
face occlusions in video, it is challenging to correctly pre-
dict the label of every frame. As such, we empirically
assume a video is DeepFake-generated if a certain num-
ber of frames in this video are detected as fake. Thus we
feed all frames of the video to the CNN based model and
then return average the top third of the output score as the
overall output of the video. Figure 5 shows the video-
level performance of each type of CNN model. VGG16,
ResNet50, ResNet101 and ResNet152 can achieve AUC
performance 84.5%, 98.7%, 99.1%, 97.8% respectively. In
this video based evaluation metric, ResNet network still per-
forms ∼ 15% better than VGG16. Yet, each ResNet model
has similar performance, as in the case of image-level clas-
sification.
4.2. Evaluations on DeepfakeTIMIT
In addition, we also validate our method on another
DeepFake video dataset DeepfakeTIMIT [18]. This
dataset contains two set of fake videos which are made
using a lower quality (LQ) with 64 x 64 input/output
Figure 6. Performance of each CNN model on all frames in LQ set
of DeepFakeTIMIT [18].
Figure 7. Performance of each CNN model on all frames in HQ set
of DeepFakeTIMIT [18].
size model and higher quality (HQ) with 128 x 128
size model, respectively. Each fake video set has 32
subjects, where each subject has 10 videos with faces
swapped. Each video is 512 × 384 and lasts ∼ 4 sec-
onds. The original videos of corresponding 32 subjects
are from VidTIMIT dataset [29]. We select subset of
each subject from original dataset VidTIMIT and all
fake videos from DeepfakeTIMIT for validation (10537
original images and 34023 fake images for each quality
set). We evaluate our four models on each frame of all
videos based on AUC metric, where the performance of
VGG16, ResNet50, ResNet101 and ResNet152 models on
LQ and HQ video sets are 84.6%, 99.9%, 97.6%, 99.4%
and 57.4%, 93.2%, 86.9%, 91.2% respectively, see Figure 6
and Figure 7.
We have also tested our algorithm on several DeepFake
videos that were generated and uploaded to YouTube by
anonymous users. In Figure 8, we show the detection re-
sults as the output score from the ResNet50 based CNN
model for one particular example1, where an output of 0
corresponds to a frame free of the warping artifacts. As
these results show, the CNN model is effective in detecting
the existence of such artifacts, which can be used to deter-
mine if these videos are synthesized using the DeepFake
algorithm.
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BU9YAHigNx8
Figure 8. Example of our method on a DeepFake generated video
clip from YouTube (left) and original video clip (right).
Table 1. AUC performance of our method and other state-of-the-
art methods on UADFV and DeepfakeTIMIT datasets.
Methods UADFV DeepfakeTIMITLQ HQ
Two-stream NN [35] 85.1 83.5 73.5
Meso-4 [1] 84.3 87.8 68.4
MesoInception-4 82.1 80.4 62.7
HeadPose [34] 89.0 - -
Ours-VGG16 84.5 84.6 57.4
Ours-ResNet50 97.4 99.9 93.2
Ours-ResNet101 95.4 97.6 86.9
Ours-ResNet152 93.8 99.4 91.2
4.3. Comparing with State-of-the-arts
We compare the AUC performance of our method with
other state-of-the-art methods: the face tampering de-
tection method Two-stream NN [35], and two DeepFake
detection methods MesoNet [1] and HeadPose [34] on
the UADFV dataset and DeepfakeTIMIT dataset. For
MesoNet, we test the proposed two architectures: Meso-4
and MesoInception-4. Table 1 shows the performance of all
the methods. As the results show, our ResNet models out-
perform all other methods. Specifically, ResNet50 achieves
best performance, which outperforms Two-stream NN by ∼
16% on both datasets that thereby demonstrates the efficacy
of our method on DeepFake video detection. Our method
also outperforms Meso-4 and MesoInception-4 by ∼ 17%
and ∼ 21% on both datasets. Specifically, our method has
a notable advance in HQ set of DeepfakeTIMIT. Since
MesoNet is trained using self-collected DeepFake generated
videos, it may over-fit to a specific distribution of DeepFake
videos in training. In contrast, our method focuses on more
intuitive aspect in DeepFake video generation: resolution
inconsistency in face warping, which is thereby more robust
to DeepFake videos of different sources. HeadPose utilizes
head pose inconsistency to distinguish real and fake videos.
However, such physiological signal may not be notable in
frontal faces, such that our method outperforms it by ∼ 8%
on UADFV.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we describe a new deep learning based
method that can effectively distinguish AI-generated fake
videos (DeepFake Videos) from real videos. Our method is
based on the observations that current DeepFake algorithm
can only generate images of limited resolutions, which are
then needed to be further transformed to match the faces to
be replaced in the source video. Such transforms leave cer-
tain distinctive artifacts in the resulting DeepFake Videos,
which can be effectively captured by a dedicated deep neu-
ral network model. We evaluate our method on several dif-
ferent sets of available DeepFake Videos which demonstrate
its effectiveness in practice.
As the technology behind DeepFake keeps evolving, we
will continuing improve the detection method. First, we
would like to evaluate and improve the robustness of our de-
tection method with regards to multiple video compression.
Second, we currently using predesigned network structure
for this task (e.g., resnet or VGG), but for more efficient de-
tection, we would like to explore dedicated network struc-
ture for the detection of DeepFake videos.
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